The Philosophy of Giambattista VicoCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico
Croce, Benedetto
Vico, Giambattista, 1668-1744
It seems undeniable, then, that the application of the _"verum-factum"_
made in the New Science is the only one which corresponds to the
criterion previously formulated. The earlier attempt at an application
of it to mathematics, though important in other respects and well
calculated to free the mind from mathematical prejudice, cannot be
considered a true or strict use of it. It is possible that Vico
was sometimes vaguely conscious of the difference between the two
applications, the strict and the metaphorical, which as a rule he
confused and treated as identical. The science of the world of man, he
says, proceeds exactly as does geometry, which while it constructs
out of its elements or contemplates the world of quantity, itself
creates it; but with proportionately greater reality, since order has
no connexion with human affairs, containing as they do neither points,
lines, surfaces, nor figures. Another indication of his gradually
dawning consciousness that he had now for the first time in his
doctrine of the world of man discovered a true and proper knowledge,
not a mere fiction of knowledge, may perhaps be seen in the much
greater conviction, warmth, and enthusiasm with which he now uses the
epithet "divine": quite a different thing from the chilly, if not
absolutely ironical, _ad Dei instar_ of the _De antiquissima._ The
proofs of the New Science, he says more than once, with fervour, "are
divine in their nature, and should give thee, Reader, a divine joy:
since in God knowledge and creation are one."
The conversion of the true with the created was bound to react upon
the treatment of certitude in one, perhaps the chief, of the various
meanings in which Vico uses the word, namely, historical fact: the
_peculiare, certum,_ as opposed to the _commune_ or _verum._ This forms
the other important section of Vico's second theory of knowledge. In
the former theory these cognitions were, as we saw, legitimised and
protected by being put on a level with all other kinds of knowledge,
all of them equally weak or equally strong, being all alike founded on
probability or authority, whether of the individual (autopsy) or of
mankind.
But now that the knowledge of the human mind and its laws was rescued
from the region of authority and probability, historical fact, although
still in a sense, by its very nature, founded upon authority, was
placed in a new light. The certain must enter into a new relation,
confronted as it now was not by another certainty, that is, mere
probable knowledge of the human mind, but by a truth, a piece of
philosophical knowledge.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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