The Philosophy of Giambattista VicoCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico
Croce, Benedetto
Vico, Giambattista, 1668-1744
This same principle of religion and theology had been already invoked
in a philosophical context by certain sceptics, as a weapon against
the presumptuous claims of human knowledge. Francisco Sanchez, for
example, in his _Quod nihil scitur_ (1581), in discussing the difficulty
of knowing the nature and powers of the soul, had observed that if man
could have this knowledge in a perfect degree he would be like God,
or rather he would be God himself: since it is impossible "that one
should know perfectly things which he has not created, nor could God
have created things of which he had not perfect foreknowledge, nor
ruled them when created: he himself therefore, being alone the perfect
wisdom, knowledge, and intellect, penetrates all things, is wise
concerning all things, knows all things, and understands all things,
because he is all things and in all things, and all things are he and
in him" (_perfecte cognoscere quis quae non creavit, nec Deus creare
potuisset nec creata regere quae non perfecte praecognovisset: ipse
ergo solus sapientia cognitio intellectus perfectus omnia penetrat
omnia sapit omnia cognoscit omnia intelligit, quia ipse omnia est et
in omnibus, omniaque ipse sunt et in ipso_).[1] But Sanchez appeals to
this thought only in passing, and without grasping its philosophical
import or realising that his hand was resting upon a treasure; while
Vico for the first time drew from the praise of the infinite power
and wisdom of God, and from their contrast with the limited faculties
of man, the universal principle of his theory of knowledge, that the
condition under which a thing can be known is that the knower should
have made it, that the true is identical with the created: _verum ipsum
factum._
This, he explained, is precisely what is meant by saying that science
is to know by causes, _per causas scire._ Since a cause is that which
has no need of anything external in order to produce its effect, it
is the genus or mode of a thing: to know the cause is to be able to
realise the thing, to deduce it from its cause and create it. In other
words, it is an ideal repetition of a process which has been or is
being practically performed. Cognition and action must be convertible
and identical, just as with God intellect and will are convertible and
form one single unity.
Now once this connexion of the true with the created is recognised as
the ideal, and indeed, since the ideal is the truly real, as the true
nature of science, the first consequence of such a recognition must be
that science is unattainable to man. If God created the world, he alone
knows it _per causas,_ he alone knows its genera or modes, he alone
possesses scientific knowledge of it. Did man make the world? Did he
make his own soul?
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