The Philosophy of Giambattista VicoCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico
Croce, Benedetto
Vico, Giambattista, 1668-1744
To another group of the Cartesian sciences, however, Vico seems to
grant a privileged position, one, that is, not of consciousness but
of science strictly so called, in the sphere not of certitude but
of truth; namely, the mathematical sciences. These, according to
him, form the only region in which man's knowledge is identical in
character with God's, perfect and demonstrative. This is not due, as
Descartes supposed, to their self-evident character. Self-evidence,
when employed in physical science and in matters of action, does
not yield truth of the same conclusiveness as in mathematics. Nor
is mathematics in itself self-evident. What clear and distinct idea
can lead, for instance, to the conception of a line as composed of
points having no parts? But the indivisible point which cannot be
conceived in the world of reality, can be nevertheless denned. By
defining certain names, man creates the elements of mathematics; by
the postulates, he carries them on to infinity; by the axioms, he
establishes certain eternal truths; and, disposing these elements with
the help of these infinities and this eternity, he creates the truth
which he teaches. The validity of mathematics then arises not from the
Cartesian principle, but precisely from Vico's other proposition, the
conversion of knowledge with creation. "We demonstrate mathematics,
because we create their truth" (_mathematica demonstramus, quia verum
facimus_). Man assumes unity and multiplicity, points and figures, and
creates numbers and quantities which he knows perfectly because they
are his own work. Mathematics is a constructive science; not only in
its problems, but even in its theorems, which are commonly supposed
to be mere objects of contemplation. For this reason it is a science
which demonstrates _per causas,_ in opposition to that other common
view which excludes from mathematics the concept of causation. It is in
fact the only one among all the human sciences which truly demonstrates
by causes. Hence its extraordinary accuracy. The whole secret of the
geometrical method lies first in defining the terms, that is, creating
the concepts which are to be the subject matter of our reasoning;
secondly, in establishing certain common principles by mutual
consent of the disputants; and lastly, if required, in making certain
postulates of such a nature that they can be granted, to enable us to
proceed with our deductions, which without such an agreement could
make no progress; then, upon these principles, to advance by degrees
from the demonstration of the simplest truths to the most complex, and
not to affirm the complex propositions before examining singly their
component parts.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account