What, then, are they? Kant’s answer is that they are forms of our perception. Space is the form of external perception, and time is the form of internal perception, and Kant holds that by this answer we can understand both how our knowledge of space and time may be a priori, how spatial and temporal distinctions may be abstracted from the differences of things, and how we may avoid the difficulties consequent on regarding time and space as independent things. What, then, does Kant mean by _form_? He seems to mean two things, which he does not clearly distinguish. The first meaning is best described in his own words: "In the phenomenon I call what corresponds to the sensation the matter of the phenomenon, and that which causes that the manifold of the phenomenon is perceived as arranged in specific relations I call the form of the phenomenon." We are here face to face with the ultimate difference of form and matter, or order and that which is ordered. When Kant calls time and space the form of our perception he is simply calling attention to the fact that in all that we perceive we find this distinction. It is something found, given, not made by us. By the word "form" Kant does not mean anything specially subjective as contrasted with matter or content, for he carefully distinguishes between space and time, and such qualities as colour, which get their nature in part, he thinks, from the specific nature of the sense organ. Compared with such qualities space and time are objective. The phrase "forms of our perception," then, does not really explain anything about space and time; it only emphasises the fact that the distinction between space and time and objects in them is found in what we perceive, and that there is no meaning in discussing either side of the distinction as though it were quite independent of what we perceive.