One of the chief differences between logicians and men of letters is
that the latter mean many different things by one word, whereas the
former do not--at least nowadays. Most mathematicians belong to the
class of men of letters.
I once had a manservant who told me on a certain occasion that he "never
thought a word about it." I was doubtful whether to class him with such
eminent mathematicians as are mentioned in the last chapter, or as a
supporter of Max Müller's theory of the identity of thought and
language. However, since the man was very untruthful, and he told me
that he meant what he said and said what he meant,[32] the conclusion is
probably correct that he really believed that the meanings of his words
were not the words themselves. Thus I think it most probable that my
manservant had been a mathematician but had escaped by the aid of logic.
As regards his remark that he meant what he said and said what he
meant, he plainly wished to pride himself on certain virtues which he
did not possess, and was not indifferent to applause, which, however,
was never evoked. The virtues, if so they be, and the applause were
withheld for other reasons than that the above statements are either
nonsensical or false. Suppose that "I say what I mean" expresses a
truth. What I say (or write) is always a symbol--words (or marks); and
what I mean by the symbol is the meaning of the symbol and not the
symbol itself. So the remark cannot express a truth, any more than the
name "Wellington" won the battle of Waterloo.
FOOTNOTES:
[31] _F. L._, pp. 246-7.
[32] The Hatter (see Appendix H) pointed out that there is a difference
between these two assertions. Thus, he clearly showed that he was a
nominalist, and philosophically opposed to the March Hare who had
recommended Alice to say what she meant.
CHAPTER IX
AMBIGUITY AND SYMBOLIC LOGIC
The universal use of some system of Symbolic Logic would not only enable
everybody easily to deal with exceedingly complicated arguments, but
would prevent ambiguous arguments. In denying the indispensability of
Symbolic Logic in the former state of things, Keynes[33] is probably
alone, against the need strongly felt by Alice when speaking to the
Duchess,[34] and most modern logicians. It may be noticed that the
Duchess is more consistent than Keynes, for Keynes really uses the signs
for logical multiplication and addition of Boole and Venn under the
different shapes of the words "and" and "or."
As regards ambiguity, a translation of _Hymns Ancient and Modern_ into,
say, Peanesque, would prevent the puzzle of childhood as to whether the
"his" in
And Satan trembles when he sees
The weakest saint upon his knees
refers to the saint's knees or Satan's.
FOOTNOTES:
[33] In his _Fm. L._
[34] See Appendix I.
CHAPTER X
LOGICAL ADDITION AND THE UTILITY OF SYMBOLISM
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