The Philosophy of Natural Theology: An Essay in confutation of the scepticism of the present dayJackson, William
Religion
The Philosophy of Natural Theology: An Essay in confutation of the scepticism of the present day
Jackson, William
Natural theology; Religion -- Philosophy; Religion and science
A beautiful childhood is a very beautiful reality. Partly because
of the exquisite simplicity which tones down and harmonizes all its
impulses. But, very often, its beauty is only known in its loss;--and
we mourn in after years over hope, love, and peace, broken down by
life's attrition;--yet fair to look upon, even in their ruins.[ag]
No one is likely to doubt that the belief we have been describing, is
peculiar to and characteristic of Man. A more subtle question would be
this;--Suppose it could be taken away, how nearly would Man and brute
approach each other?[164] A question deserving the attention of every
one, who lives
"In self-adoring pride securely mailed."
Probably, the proudest of mankind little think how deeply their
culture, art, and refinement, are indebted to a faith shared by the
lowliest. One point, at least, seems clear,--if Morality did not perish
in the wreck, a true and independent moral sense would bring us back to
a belief in our own souls, their immortality, and their God.
Another question more essential to our purpose has been buried under
heaps of fallacy and misconception. Theists are often told that the
ideas of a Deity,--a future life,--and generally all that is conceived
as supernatural, have no absolute trustworthiness;--they are not
self-evident axioms, and they cannot be demonstrated. One answer to
these alleged difficulties has been implicitly given in the last
Chapter. If such objections are valid at all, they are valid against
every practical first-truth therein considered. They are valid against
_all_ primary practical truths, looked at from the theoretical side,
and tested by the rules proper to what is called pure Reason;--Reason,
that is to say, not applied, but speculative. But, then, it is from
this very employment of tests upon truth not _in pari materia_,
that the first stage of fallacy begins. The _second_ step in error
follows naturally from the first. Compared with the clearness and
definition of mathematics, all other axioms and proofs appear dim and
dubious. The consequence is, that our minds fall into trains of false
comparison on the all-important subject of certitude. Errors of that
kind are always growing mischiefs; our tongues follow the lead of
our thoughts, and hazy thinking becomes hazy speaking. Not only so,
but words develope themselves into the leaders of thought; and hazy
speaking engenders a hazier thinking still. People take mathematical
certainty to be the sole type of all true and valuable certainties.
Practical maxims are spoken of, as merely probable, Right and Wrong as
the efflux of moral sentiments.[165] Few seem to be aware _how_ the
philosophical arrangements of first-truths ought to be applied. They
should be applied to discriminate the _processes_, by which various
kinds of truths are discoverable;--they stamp a character upon them,
when discovered; but they do _not_ determine the intrinsic worth and
validity of the discoveries.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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