It is clear that the right of the supreme authorities is nothing else
than simple natural right, limited, indeed, by the power, not of every
individual, but of the multitude, which is guided, as it were, by one
mind--that is, as each individual in the state of Nature, so the body
and mind of a dominion have as much right as they have power. And thus
each single citizen or subject has the less right, the more the
commonwealth exceeds him in power, and each citizen consequently does
and has nothing but what he may by the general decree of the
commonwealth defend.
If the commonwealth grant to any man the right, and therewith the
authority (for else it is but a gift of words) to live after his own
mind, by that very act it abandons its own right, and transfers the same
to him, to whom it has given such authority. But if it has given this
authority to two or more, I mean authority to live each after his own
mind, by that very act it has divided the dominion, and if, lastly, it
has given this same authority to every citizen, it has thereby destroyed
itself, and there remains no more a commonwealth, but everything returns
to the state of Nature; all of which is very manifest from what goes
before. And thus it follows, that it can by no means be conceived, that
every citizen should by the ordinance of the commonwealth live after his
own mind, and accordingly this natural right of being one's own judge
ceases in the civil state. I say expressly "by the ordinance of the
commonwealth," for if we weigh the matter aright, the natural right of
every man does not cease in the civil state. For man, alike in the
natural and in the civil state, acts according to the laws of his own
nature, and consults his own interest. Man, I say, in each state is led
by fear or hope to do or leave undone this or that; but the main
difference between the two states is this, that in the civil state all
fear the same things, and all have the same ground of security, and
manner of life; and this certainly does not do away with the
individual's faculty of judgment. For he that is minded to obey all the
commonwealth's orders, whether through fear of its power or through love
of quiet, certainly consults after his own heart his own safety and
interest.
Moreover, we cannot even conceive, that every citizen should be allowed
to interpret the commonwealth's decrees or laws. For were every citizen
allowed this, he would thereby be his own judge, because each would
easily be able to give a color of right to his own deeds, which by the
last section is absurd.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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