The Philosophy of the ConditionedMansel, Henry Longueville
Religion
The Philosophy of the Conditioned
Mansel, Henry Longueville
Hamilton, William, Sir, 1788-1856; Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873. Examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy
[L] This part of Hamilton's teaching is altogether
repudiated by a recent writer, who, strangely enough,
professes to be his disciple, while rejecting all that
is really characteristic of his philosophy. Mr. Herbert
Spencer, in his work on _First Principles_, endeavours
to press Sir W. Hamilton into the service of Pantheism
and Positivism together, by adopting the negative
portion only of his philosophy--in which, in common with
many other writers, he declares the absolute to be
inconceivable by the mere intellect,--and rejecting the
positive portions, in which he most emphatically
maintains that the belief in a personal God is
imperatively demanded by the facts of our moral and
emotional consciousness. Mr. Spencer regards religion as
nothing more than a consciousness of natural facts as
being in their ultimate genesis unaccountable--a theory
which is simply a combination of the positivist
doctrine, that we know only the relations of phenomena,
with the pantheist assumption of the name of God to
denote the substance or power which lies beyond
phenomena. No theory can be more opposed to the
philosophy of the conditioned than this. Sir W.
Hamilton's fundamental principle is, that consciousness
must be accepted entire, and that the moral and
religious feelings, which are the primary source of our
belief in a personal God, are in no way invalidated by
the merely negative inferences which have deluded men
into the assumption of an impersonal absolute; the
latter not being legitimate deductions from
consciousness rightly interpreted. Mr. Spencer, on the
other hand, takes these negative inferences as the only
basis of religion, and abandons Hamilton's great
principle of the distinction between knowledge and
belief, by quietly dropping out of his system the facts
of consciousness which make such a distinction
necessary. His whole system is, in fact, a pertinent
illustration of Hamilton's remark, that "the phenomena
of matter" [and of mind, he might add, treated by
materialistic methods], "taken by themselves (you will
observe the qualification, taken by themselves), so far
from warranting any inference to the existence of a God,
would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his
negation." Mr. Spencer, like Mr. Mill, denies the
freedom of the will; and this, according to Hamilton,
leads by logical consequence to Atheism.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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