'Reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the affections part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and the imagination, against the affections; for _the affections themselves_ carry ever an appetite to _good_, as reason doth. _The difference is_'--mark it--'the difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely _the present; reason_ beholdeth the future and _sum_ of time. And therefore the present _filling the imagination most_, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote, _appear as present_, then, _upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth_.' Not less important than that is this art in his scheme of learning. No wonder that the department of learning which he refers to the imagination should take that prime place in his grand division of it, and be preferred deliberately and on principle to the two others. 'Logic differeth from Rhetoric chiefly in this, that logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore _Aristotle_ doth _wisely_ place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, (and when we come to put together the works of this author, we shall find that _that_ and none other is the place it takes in _his_ system, that that is just the bridge it makes in his plan of operations.)' The proofs and demonstrations of logic _are towards all men indifferent and the same_: but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric _ought to differ according to the auditors_. Orpheus in sylvis inter delphinas Arion. Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend so far, that if a man should speak of _the same thing to several persons_, he should speak to them _all respectively, and several ways_; and there was a great folio written on this plan which came out in those days dedicated 'to the Great Variety of Readers. From the most able to him that can but spell'; (this is just the doctrine, too, which the Continental philosopher sets forth we see);--though this '_politic_ part of eloquence in private speech,' he goes on to say here, 'it is easy for the greatest orators _to want; whilst by observing their well graced forms of speech, they lose the volubility_ of APPLICATION; and _therefore_ it shall not be _amiss_ to recommend this _to better inquiry_, not being curious whether we place it here, or in that part which concerneth _policy._'