The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and EthicCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic
Croce, Benedetto
Economics; Ethics; Will
But this mode of existence with which the practical activity manifests
itself in life, as though physically limited, has no certainty, when
separated from the theoretical life, nor is it, as might be believed,
a fact that imposes itself. Facts never impose themselves, save
metaphorically: it is only our thought which _imposes_ them upon
_itself,_ when it has criticized them and has recognized their reality.
That existence and that distinction, which seem so obvious that one
can touch them with one's hand, are at bottom nothing but the result
of primary and superficial philosophic reflection, which posits as
essentially distinct that which is so only at a first glance and in
the mass. Indeed, if we continue to meditate with the same method and
assumptions as in the first instance, we shall find that those very
distinctions, which reflection had established, are by reflection
annulled. It is not true that men are practical or theoretical.
The theoretical man is also practical; he lives, he wills, he acts
like all the others. The so-called practical man is also theoretical;
he contemplates, believes, thinks, reads, writes, loves music and the
other arts. Those works that had been looked upon as inspired entirely
by the practical spirit, when examined more closely, are found to
be exceedingly complex and rich in theoretic elements--meditations,
reasonings, historical research, ideal contemplations. Those works
on the other hand that had been assumed to be manifestations of the
purely artistic or philosophic spirit, are also products of the will,
for without the will nothing can be done; the artist cannot prepare
himself for his masterpiece for years and years, nor the thinker bring
to completion his system. Was not the battle of Austerlitz also a
work of thought and the _Divine Comedy_ also a work of will? From
such reflections as these, which might be easily multiplied, arises
a mistrust, not only of the statement first made, but also of the
inquiry that has been undertaken. It is as though one had filled a
vessel with much difficulty and were then obliged to empty it anew
with a like effort, to find oneself again facing the vessel, empty as
before. Or one adheres to the conclusion that neither the theoretic
nor the practical exists as distinct, but that they are one single
fact, which is one or other of the two, or a third to be determined,
manifesting itself concretely in infinite shades and gradations, which
we arbitrarily attempt to reduce to one or more classes, separating and
denominating them as distinct in a not less arbitrary manner.
[Sidenote: _Insufficiency of the psychological method in philosophy._]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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