Thus no other answer is possible to the question asked as to whether the legislative activity be moral or merely economic, save that it may be the one or the other, and therefore, that it is not of necessity moral; thus, defining it in its full extension, it must be called _generically practical,_ or taken in itself, _merely economic._ [Sidenote: _Juridical activity: its economic character._] Passing now from the legislative activity to that of him who realizes and executes the law (an activity that we may call _juridical,_ in order not to confound it with the other), and asking whether juridical activity be moral or distinct from morality and if distinct, what is its distinctive characteristic, the answer cannot but be most simple for us who have attained to our present position. So simple indeed, that to give it would seem to be almost superfluous. Not only must the activity of carrying out the law not be intrinsically diverse from the activity of legislating, but as has been seen, it obeys exclusively practical principles, economic and ethic. Hence the 'juridical activity can be merely economic and it can be moral; and seeing that economicity is the general form that of itself involves the other, the juridical activity is generically practical, or _economic. _ As such and in so far as it is such, it is at once distinct from and united with the moral form. [Sidenote: _Its consequent identity with the economic activity._] But juridical activity does not merely enter the economic activity; it is exactly identical with it: juridical activity and economic activity are _synonyms._ Legislative activity enters economy and nevertheless distinguishes itself from it, as volition of the abstract, indeterminate volition. The juridical activity is on the other hand concrete and determined, like the other, nor is it distinguished from it by any secondary character. It might be attempted to subdistinguish the economic and juridical activity, while admitting the generic identification, and to look upon the latter as such that although obeying the economic principle, it is yet developed _under the laws;_ whereas the former would exist even where _laws were wanting._ But the distinction would be empirical, of undulating boundaries. Strictly speaking, man is surrounded with laws in all his actions, and he always acts under all the laws, and at the same time he effectually acts under none of them, save that of his own practical conscience.