Now we have already met with the concept of feeling on more than one occasion, when investigating the philosophy of the theoretic spirit, as something supplying a theoretical need outside the theoretic forms generally admitted, or as a special form of theoretic activity. Every time that we have done this, an attentive examination has caused it to disappear before our eyes, and has generally helped us, either to discover something previously unknown, or to confirm the necessity of contested categories. [Sidenote: _Feeling as herald of the æsthetic form;_] Thus it happened that when a special _æsthetic_ function was not recognized and it was attempted to explain it, either intellectualistically, as nothing but an inferior form of philosophy, or historically, as a reproduction of the historical and natural datum, or almost as the satisfaction of certain volitional wants (hedonistic theory), the view of art as neither a form of the intellect nor of perception nor of will, but of _feeling,_ was an advance, as also was the appeal to men of _feeling_ to recognize and to judge it. As a result of this insistence, it was eventually discovered that art possessed an absolutely simple and ingenuous theoretic form, without either intellectual or historical contents, the form of the pure intuition which is that of the æsthetic and artistic activity. Whoever returns to treat of art as a product of feeling, after this discovery of the pure intuition, falls back from the determinate to the semi-determinate, and is at the mercy of all the dangers which arise from it. [Sidenote: _As herald of the intuitive element in Historiography._] The theory of historiography owes its progress in like manner to the demonstration that it is impossible to deduce the historical statement from concepts, but that we must deduce it in final analysis from an immediate _feeling_ of the real, that is to say, from the _intuitive_ element, which inevitably exists in every historical reconstruction, as in every perception. On the other hand, and in altogether another sense, reacting against the false idea of an extra--subjective historical objectivity, to be found in the mere reproduction of the datum, it was made evident that no historical narration is possible without the _reaction of feeling_ in respect to the datum. Thus was discovered the indispensability of the _intellective_ element in the historical affirmation. Whoever has recourse to feeling as a factor in historiography, after this complete constitution of the historical judgment, returns from the clear to the confused, from light, if not to darkness, then to twilight. [Sidenote: _Feeling as herald of the pure concept in philosophical Logic._]