The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and EthicCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic
Croce, Benedetto
Economics; Ethics; Will
condition a future act of will, whereas it is in reality the past act
of will looking at itself in the glass; a judgment that is not really
practical but _historical._
The illusion that things happen differently is caused by the fact
that we possess judgments concerning our past volitions, which are
afterwards collected into abstract formulæ, such as that "it is well
to cut wood." But, on the one hand, those formulæ and judgments are
in their turn formed from previous volitions, and on the other, those
formulæ do not possess any absolute value in the single and concrete
situation, so that they can be modified and substituted for others that
affirm the opposite. The question is not whether cutting wood has been
as a rule a good thing for me in the past, nor whether I have generally
willed it in the past: the question is to will it at this moment, that
is, to posit the cutting of wood at this moment as a good thing.
[Sidenote: _Posteriority of the practical concepts._]
As is the case with the pretended practical judgments and concepts of
classes formed upon them, so the concepts that they imply, of _things
good, of ideals, of ends, of actions worthy of being willed,_ and so
on, do not precede, but follow the volition that has taken place. These
concepts are the incipient reflection, scientific and philosophical,
upon the spontaneous acts of the will, and we cannot practise science
nor philosophize save about facts that have already taken place: if
the fact do not precede, there can be no theory. Certainly theory
does not do other than seek out the already created and give the
real principles of actions in the form of thought principles, in
the same manner as Logic discovers those principles that live and
operate in logical thought. But since the formula of the principle of
contradiction is not necessary for thinking without contradiction, but
presupposes it, so the concepts of ends, of things good, and of ideals
are not necessary for volitions, but presuppose them.
[Sidenote: _Origin of intellectualist and sentimentalist doctrines._]
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