The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and EthicCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic
Croce, Benedetto
Economics; Ethics; Will
We should rather adapt them in the best way possible
for our own ends, or for those of society. This does not, however,
imply that they are fixed beings, and that each of those classes is
heterogeneous in respect of the others. If, with the help of a foolish
positivist philosophy, we make of the idea of the delinquent something
necessary, a natural being, as it is called, confounding naturalistic
with natural and incorrectly hypostasizing gnoseological procedure,
then, and then alone, are we right in reacting and in denying.
[Sidenote: _2a. False deduction of the empirical from the
philosophical._]
And yet those solutions of philosophers, who think that they are
solving empirical questions by annulling or ignoring them, do not yet
represent the worst that happens when philosophy usurps the function
of empiria. Such misunderstanding, such hardness of hearing, may be
proof of a spirit so energetically directed to universale that it is
unable to see anything else, and may even for that reason possess
some sympathetic quality. The worst of the worst is the entering upon
empirical questions, not in order to annul, but to take sides in them
and to solve them philosophically.
[Sidenote: _Affirmations relating to the contingent changed into
philosophemes._]
This cannot be done, save by supporting empirical concepts with
rigorous and philosophical concepts, confounding the one with the other
by a trick of thought, and sometimes of words, making use of synonyms
and homonyms, and pronouncing in the name of philosophy arbitrary
solutions suggested only by caprice or self-interest. This is the
complete corruption, alike of philosophy and of empiria. Not satisfied
with making practical classes follow philosophical concepts of the
practical, it is then sought to deduce the former from the latter,
and behold them now deriving virtues and duties from the universal
concept of practical moral activity, by means of the divisions of
internal and external, of part and whole, of individual and society.
These are concepts of relations, not susceptible of division, and
therefore incapable of serving as base for empirical divisions. Or
they have recourse to the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis,
which is the universal concrete itself, constituting unity, and
therefore incapable of serving as basis for division. Or they will
deduce the moral virtues according to the three faculties, as virtues
of representation, feeling and thought, or according to the two of the
will and the intellect, as dianoetic and ethical virtues; as though the
base of the division of the _practical_ could be that of _theoretical_
and _practical._ Empirical concepts become in this way all false,
whereas, in their real nature, they are neither false nor true.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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