The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and EthicCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic
Croce, Benedetto
Economics; Ethics; Will
There is no thesis, however absurd, which cannot be defended with
such a method. All know that there are aristocratic and democratic
philosophers, libertarian and authoritarian, anarchical and
organicist, socialistic and anti-socialistic, bellicose and pacific,
feminist and antifeminist; and there are others who maintain the
right to lie, the right to suicide, the right to prostitution, the
right to incest, to making of themselves caterers for the scaffold,
the right to the penalty of death. These solutions can be morally and
politically justified in certain definite and particular cases. There
are other solutions rationally unjustifiable in the individual case
and put forward only through passion, wickedness, or prejudice, but in
both hypotheses, they are outside philosophy and within it so false as
to be odious, as that is odious which is maintained, not by means of
intrinsic reason, but by imposition altogether extrinsic and external.
[Sidenote: _Reason of the rebellion against rules._]
Such hatefulness explains the rebellion against moral rules and
concepts that has often taken place. This, together with that against
literary classes and rules and others of the same sort, forms part
of the vast movement of rebellion against empirical or empiricized
philosophy. In truth, when those rules and ideas are taken by
themselves, no rebellion is possible, because they do not exert any
pressure and obey the orders of the man who has made them. But it
happens otherwise, when they become rigid and philosophical, and
as is said, absolute, claiming to substitute themselves as such for
philosophy and to provide a base for judgments. In addition to this,
from the enforced union of philosophemes with rules, has arisen the
false idea of philosophizing about the practical (about an Ethic,
for example), which showed itself to be _practical,_ or, as is said,
_normative._
[Sidenote: _Limits between philosophy and empiria._]
Philosophy, by taking part in empirical questions, ruins both itself
and them, because it loses the serenity, the dignity, and the utility
that are intrinsic to it. In like manner, the empirical disciplines
ruin themselves and philosophy when they claim to philosophize with
their classes, which are not categories, with their pseudo-concepts,
which are not concepts, with their _generalia,_ which are not
_universalia._ Here too, safety lies in distinction: the observation of
distinction alone makes possible beneficent co-operation.
IX
HISTORICAL ANNOTATIONS
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