The Philosophy Which Shows the Physiology of Mesmerism and Explains the Phenomenon of ClairvoyancePasley, T. H.
Philosophy
The Philosophy Which Shows the Physiology of Mesmerism and Explains the Phenomenon of Clairvoyance
Pasley, T. H.
Mesmerism
Luminousness, light, colour, sound, heat, cold, flavour, odour, are
sensations,--each of the entire is traceable from the function of the
senses to the sensorium: deduct these, there is nothing perceived or to
perceive; by means of the senses, respectively, we have knowledge of
each,--and by the senses exciting the brain are the whole produced, as
sensible effects. Outward bodies can have nothing the same or similar
to sensible effects; and therefore nothing of the whole belongs to
matter or bodies, or to physical philosophy. To mechanical nature the
whole would be useless; to sensitive beings only are they useful; to us
they are substitutes for Nature's deficiency in these respects; and the
whole present a convincing proof of the wise, the strict economy of the
Great Architect in his works.
The objection is unfounded, that the external object should be like
the sensation, in order to produce such sensation. But where is
there sound in musical string or in the metal of a bell to promote
the sensation; or yellow in the snowdrop to promote the sensation
of yellow, when the eyes are jaundiced or a stained lens is before
them: the sensation of pain is not the effect of pain; it and pain
are one. That which in health promotes the sensation known as sweet,
promotes that of bitter in sickness; the object is the same, the
sensation changeable. In reason it cannot be said that fire is like
the sensation, or the latter should be burning hot in the brain, where
it is excited; neither is any material thing outside of us like a
sensation of the brain; nor does the sensation inform us of anything
but itself, excepting that it has a remote external cause. The common
show-box exhibits the same landscape picture under the different
aspects of summer, autumn, winter, and spring, according to the stained
lens before the eyes; the picture has not all these colours, nor any,
it is a mere black and white print, in which the stained lenses make no
alteration. Nothing can be like a sensation but a sensation.
That the objects we perceive and their remote cause are distinct
things, is proved by the perception being that of a coin of the
half-crown size, when the eyes are directed to a shilling and a convex
lens before the face; if the lens be red, yellow, or blue, so is the
perceived object, which is not the white shilling. We are invisible to
each other; what is imagined to be a man's appearance, may be described
as, various sensations of different colours symmetrically arranged,
and constituting a single optically-excited mental effect. Neither
is it the likeness of the sitter that the canvass exhibits, but the
excited perception within the sensorium of the limner; for the renewal
of which it is that he directs his eyes so frequently to the sitter's
face, which is invisible to the limner, although he feels certain that
he sees every feature.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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