The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind.Lewes, George Henry
Philosophy
The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind.
Lewes, George Henry
Mind and body; Psychophysiology
34. Apart from the primary objection to all these definitions,
namely, that they seek to express organic phenomena in terms of an
extra-organic principle, to formulate the facts _observed_ in terms
of a cause _inferred_, there is the fatal objection that they speak
confidently on what is avowedly unknown. If the force be, as Dr. Beale
says, “undiscovered,” on what grounds can he assert that it has _no_
connection with the forces which are known? All that the observed facts
warrant is the assertion that organic phenomena are special (which
no one denies), and must therefore depend on special combinations of
matter and force. But on this ground we might assume a crystallizing
Force, and a coagulating Force, having no connection with the molecular
forces manifested elsewhere: these also are special phenomena, not to
be confounded with each other.
35. Schelling defines Life as “a principle of individuation” and a
“cycle of successive changes determined and fixed by this internal
principle.” Which is so vague that it may be applied in very different
senses. Bichat’s celebrated definition (which is only a paraphrase of
a sentence in Stahl), “the sum of the functions which resist Death,”
although an endeavor to express the facts from the Intra-organic point
of view, is not only vague, but misrepresents one of the cardinal
conditions, by treating the External Medium as antagonistic to Life,
whereas Life is only possible in the relation to a Medium.
36. Were it not so vague, the definition proposed by Dugès and Béclard
would be unexceptionable: the former says it is “the special activity
of organized beings”; the latter, “the sum of the phenomena proper to
organized bodies.” When supplemented by a description of organized
bodies, these formulæ are compendious and exact. The same remark
applies to the definition of Lamarck: “that state of things which
permits organic movements; and these movements, which constitute active
life, result from a stimulus which excites them.”
37. De Blainville, and after him Comte and Charles Robin, define
it thus: “Life is the twofold internal movement of composition and
decomposition at once general and continuous.” This, excellent as
regards what is called vegetal life, is very properly objected to by
Mr. Herbert Spencer in that it excludes those nervous and muscular
functions which are the most conspicuous and distinctive of vital
phenomena. The same objection must be urged against Professor Owen’s
definition: “Life is a centre of intussusceptive assimilative force
capable of reproduction by spontaneous fission.”
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