[5] "Pragmatic" is here used in a more restricted sense than the distinctively pragmatic school of modern psychologists would commonly assign the term. "Pragmatic," "teleological," and the like terms have been extended to cover imputation of purpose as well as conversion to use. It is not intended to criticise this ambiguous use of terms, nor to correct it; but the terms are here used only in the latter sense, which alone belongs to them by force of early usage and etymology. "Pragmatic" knowledge, therefore, is such as is designed to serve an expedient end for the knower, and is here contrasted with the imputation of expedient conduct to the facts observed. The reason for preserving this distinction is simply the present need of a simple term by which to mark the distinction between worldly wisdom and idle learning. [6] Cf. Ward, _Pure Sociology_, esp. pp. 437-48. [7] Cf., e.g., Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, chap. 8. [8] Cf. James, _Psychology_, chap. 9, esp. sec. 5. [9] As currently employed, the term "pragmatic" is made to cover both conduct looking to the agent's preferential advantage, expedient conduct, and workmanship directed to the production of things that may or may not be of advantage to the agent. If the term be taken in the latter meaning, the culture of modern times is no less "pragmatic" than that of the Middle Ages. It is here intended to be used in the former sense. [10] Epistemologically speaking, activity is imputed to phenomena for the purpose of organising them into a dramatically consistent system. [11] Cf., e.g., Karl Pearson, _Grammar of Science_, and compare his ideal of inert magnitudes as set forth in his exposition with his actual work as shown in chaps. 9, 10, and 12, and more particularly in his discussions of "Mother Right" and related topics in _The Chances of Death_. [12] Cf. James, _Psychology_, Vol. II, chap. 28, pp. 633-71, esp. p. 640 note. [13] Cf. Ward, _Principles of Psychology_, pp. 439-43. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC POINT OF VIEW[1] A discussion of the scientific point of view which avowedly proceeds from this point of view itself has necessarily the appearance of an argument in a circle; and such in great part is the character of what here follows. It is in large part an attempt to explain the scientific point of view in terms of itself, but not altogether. This inquiry does not presume to deal with the origin or the legitimation of the postulates of science, but only with the growth of the habitual use of these postulates, and the manner of using them. The point of inquiry is the changes which have taken place in the secondary postulates involved in the scientific point of view--in great part a question of the progressive redistribution of emphasis among the preconceptions under whose guidance successive generations of scientists have gone to their work. * * * * *