The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min Chu ILinebarger, Paul Myron Anthony
History
The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min Chu I
Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony
Sun, Yat-sen, 1866-1925. San min zhu yi
The sharpening of the nationalist policy into a program of
anti-imperialism seems to have been the direct result of the Communist
teachings, one of the conspicuous contributions of the Marxians to the
programmatic part of the theories of Sun Yat-sen. As earlier stated, their
ideology influenced his almost not all. Their programs, on the other hand,
were such an inspiration to the Chinese nationalists that the latter had
no hesitation in accepting them. Hu Han-min, one of the moderate
Kuomintang leaders, who would certainly not go out of his way to give the
Communists credit which they did not deserve, stated unequivocally that
the Chinese did not have the slogan, “Down with Imperialism!” in the 1911
revolution, and gave much credit to the Bolsheviks for their
anti-imperialist lesson to the Chinese.(247)
In describing the political aggression of the Western states upon the
Chinese society, Sun Yat-sen began by contrasting the nature of the
inter-state vassalage which the peripheral Far Eastern states had once
owed to the Chinese core-society. He stated that the Chinese did not
practise aggression on their neighbors, and that the submission of the
neighboring realms was a submission based on respect and not on
compulsion. “If at that time all small states of Malaysia wanted to pay
tribute and adopt Chinese customs, it was because they admired Chinese
civilization and spontaneously wished to submit themselves; it was not
because China oppressed them through military force.”(248) Even the
position of the Philippines, which Sun Yat-sen thought a very profitable
and pleasant one under American rule, was not satisfactory to the
Filipinos of modern times, who, unlike the citizens of the vassal states
of old China, were dissatisfied with their subordinate positions.(249)
He pointed out that this benevolent Chinese position was destroyed as the
West appeared and annexed these various states, with the exception of
Siam. He then emphasized that this may have been done in the past with a
view to the division of China between the various great powers.(250)
This partitioning had been retarded, but the danger was still present. The
Chinese revolution of 1911 may have shown the powers that there was some
nationalism still left in China.(251)
The military danger was tremendous. “Political power can exterminate a
nation in a morning’s time. China who is now suffering through the
political oppression of the powers is in danger of perishing at any
moment. She is not safe from one day to the other.”(252) Japan could
conquer China in ten days. The United States could do it in one month.
England would take two months at the most, as would France. The reason why
the powers did not settle the Chinese question by taking the country was
because of their mutual distrust; it was not due to any fear of China. No
one country would start forth on such an adventure, lest it become
involved with the others and start a new world war.(253)
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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