But to proceed. We are all aware that there is no state (1) in the world in which greater obedience is shown to magistrates, and to the laws themselves, than Sparta. But, for my part, I am disposed to think that Lycurgus could never have attempted to establish this healthy condition, (2) until he had first secured the unanimity of the most powerful members of the state. I infer this for the following reasons. (3) In other states the leaders in rank and influence do not even desire to be thought to fear the magistrates. Such a thing they would regard as in itself a symbol of servility. In Sparta, on the contrary, the stronger a man is the more readily does he bow before constituted authority. And indeed, they magnify themselves on their humility, and on a prompt obedience, running, or at any rate not crawling with laggard step, at the word of command. Such an example of eager discipline, they are persuaded, set by themselves, will not fail to be followed by the rest. And this is precisely what has taken place. It (4) is reasonable to suppose that it was these same noblest members of the state who combined (5) to lay the foundation of the ephorate, after they had come to the conclusion themselves, that of all the blessings which a state, or an army, or a household, can enjoy, obedience is the greatest. Since, as they could not but reason, the greater the power with which men fence about authority, the greater the fascination it will exercise upon the mind of the citizen, to the enforcement of obedience. (1) See Grote, "H. G." v. 516; "Mem." III. v. 18. (2) Or, reading after L. Dindorf, {eutaxian}, "this world-renowned orderliness." (3) Or, "from these facts." (4) Or, "It was only natural that these same..." (5) Or, "helped." See Aristot. "Pol." v. 11, 3; ii. 9, 1 (Jowett, ii. 224); Plut. "Lycurg." 7, 29; Herod. i. 65; Muller, "Dorians," iii. 7, 5 (vol. ii. p. 125, Eng. tr.) Accordingly the ephors are competent to punish whomsoever they choose; they have power to exact fines on the spur of the moment; they have power to depose magistrates in mid career (6)--nay, actually to imprison them and bring them to trial on the capital charge. Entrusted with these vast powers, they do not, as do the rest of states, allow the magistrates elected to exercise authority as they like, right through the year of office; but, in the style rather of despotic monarchs, or presidents of the games, at the first symptom of an offence against the law they inflict chastisement without warning and without hesitation. (6) Or, "before the expiration of their term of office." See Plut. "Agis," 18 (Clough, iv. 464); Cic. "de Leg." iii. 7; "de Rep." ii. 33.