The demand therefore for that cast of mind which under Charles I had been the peculiarity of a successful judge no longer existed for Charles II. When definitions of law were no longer needed to support the crown in opposition to the other legitimate elements of the constitution, and when the government was in close accord with the people, there was no temptation to subject the law to such strains as it had formerly been made to bear in the effort to galvanise into life a system which had already died a natural death. Perhaps it was less that judges had become more scrupulous than that the objection to their scruples had disappeared. To whatever cause they were due, it is certain that the reign of Charles II was marked by the renewal of decisions which must have been obnoxious to the government. No doubt these are not to be found in particular cases which were regarded as of high consequence, but the tendency is perfectly visible, and in one instance at least proved to be of profound importance. This was the trial of Penn and Meade in 1670, for by the proceedings which arose from it was finally established the principle that a jury has an absolute right to give such a verdict as it thinks proper without being open to question therefore by any other person or authority whatsoever.[499] The Quakers had been indicted for an unlawful assembly, and the jury before whom they were tried, in spite of repeated direction and shameful abuse from the Lord Mayor and the Recorder, found a verdict of not guilty. For this the court sentenced the jurymen to a fine of forty marks apiece and imprisonment until the fine was paid. Bushell, the foreman, and his fellow-jurors obtained a writ of habeas corpus, and the point was argued at length on the return to the writ. Ten judges out of twelve affirmed the absolute discretion of the jury to believe or disbelieve the evidence given according to the dictates of conscience, and not only were the jurymen discharged from custody without paying the fine, but no attempt has ever been made since to contest the principle thus established.[500]