The positive outcome of philosophyDietzgen, Joseph
Philosophy
The positive outcome of philosophy
Dietzgen, Joseph
Knowledge, Theory of; Logic; Philosophy
Thought and understanding cannot be without subjective contents any more
than without an object which suggests individual reflection. Thought is
work, and like every other work it requires an object to which it is
applied. The statements: I do, I work, I think, must be completed by an
answer to the question: What are you doing, working, thinking?
Every definite idea, all actual thought, is identical with its content,
but not with its object. My desk as a picture in my mind is identical
with my idea of it. But my desk outside of my brain is a separate object
and distinct from my idea. The idea is to be distinguished from thinking
only as a part of the thought process, while the object of my thought
exists as a separate entity.
We make a distinction between thinking and being. We distinguish between
the object of sense perception and its mental image. Nevertheless the
intangible idea is also material and real. I perceive my idea of a desk
just as plainly as the desk itself. True, if I choose to call only
tangible things material, then ideas are not material. But in that case
the scent of a rose and the heat of a stove are not material. It would
be better to call thoughts sense perceptions. But if it is objected that
this would be an incorrect use of the word, because language
distinguishes material and mental things, then we dispense with the word
material and call thought real. Mind is as real as the tangible table,
as the visible light, as the audible sound. While the idea of these
things is different from the things themselves, yet it has that in
common with them that it is as real as they. Mind is not any more
different from a table, a light, a sound, than these things differ among
themselves. We do not deny that there is a difference. We merely
emphasize that they have the same general nature in common. I hope the
reader will not misunderstand me henceforth, when I call the faculty of
thought a material quality, a phenomenon of sense perception.
Every perception of the senses is based on some object. In order that
heat may be real, there must be an object, something else which is
heated. The active cannot exist without the passive. The visible cannot
exist without the faculty of sight, nor the faculty of sight without
visible things. So is the faculty of thought a phenomenon, but it can
never exist in itself, it must always be based on some sense
perception. Thought appears, like all other phenomena, in connection
with an object. The function of the brain is no more a "pure" process
than the function of the eye, the scent of a flower, the heat of a
stove, or the touch of a table. The fact that a table may be seen,
heard, or felt, is due as much to its own nature as to that of another
object with which it enters into some relation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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