Late in 1853 came the tedious conference of Vienna, with its notes, its projects of notes, its despatches, its _ultimatums_ and its _ultimatissimums_. The result was, the consumption of a vast amount of time, foolscap, post-horses, and government messengers, the concession to Austria of much more importance and consideration than she was in any way entitled to, and the retention at Besika, till the end of November, of the allied fleets, which ought to have passed through the Bosphorus more than four months before,--on the day, indeed, that the Russians crossed the Pruth. The “occupation” which ensued amounted, in fact, to the tyrannical assumption by Russia of the government of two of the finest provinces in Europe, accompanied by such atrocious acts of tyranny, that the English and French consuls found it incumbent upon them at once to withdraw. Some time after the conclusion of the treaty of Adrianople, in 1828, Count Nesselrode, writing to the Grand Duke Constantine, thus gave expression to the feelings of the government of Russia on this subject:-- “The Turkish monarchy,” said he, “is reduced to such a state as to exist only under the protection of Russia, and must comply in future with her wishes.” Then, adverting to the Principalities, he says, “The possession of these Principalities is of the less importance to us, as without maintaining troops there, which would be attended with considerable expense, we shall dispose of them at our pleasure, as well during peace as in time of war. _We shall hold the keys of a position from which it will be easy to keep the Turkish government in check_, and the Sultan will feel that any attempt to brave us again must end in his certain ruin.”