The Powers of Europe and Fall of SebastopolA British officer
History
The Powers of Europe and Fall of Sebastopol
A British officer
Crimean War, 1853-1856; Europe -- History -- 1789-1900
The whole of Europe--and no country more than Russia--had strangely
erred in its estimate of the Turkish army. Any man who could have
been found rash enough to have hinted at the possibility of the
Sultan’s troops standing before the “stalwart warriors” from the Don,
would have been laughed to scorn: yet almost every engagement has
shown them uniformly triumphant.
The Turkish army is divided into sections, commanded by generals
of division, each of whom has under his orders three generals of
brigade. The division consists of eleven regiments, six of infantry,
four of cavalry, and one of artillery. The available force of a
division comprises 20,980 men; _i. e._, 16,800 infantry, 2,880
cavalry, and 1,300 artillery-men. The infantry regiments are divided
into battalions, and the battalions into companies. The cavalry
regiments are divided into squadrons. The artillery regiments each
comprise three horse and nine foot batteries, numbering altogether
seventy-two heavy and four “grasshopper guns,” about of the same
calibre as those used at the battle of Buena Vista by General Taylor.
The Russian army has, for a long time past, been adopting from other
powers every improvement that could advantageously be introduced into
those docile but stolid ranks, and it was universally supposed to be
in the highest state of efficiency. Numerically, it was about equal
to the Turkish army immediately opposed to it. At the time to which
we allude, Nicholas had, in Georgia and Circassia, at least 148,000
men, commanded by the venerable Prince Woronzow, who does not enjoy a
brilliant military reputation, but still is considered an experienced
soldier, and one of the few trustworthy men in the Czar’s service.
Had this large army not been engaged in holding in check the hardy
and active hordes of Schamyl, it might possibly have been available
to threaten Constantinople; but danger from the quarter we allude
to was never very imminent, for the Turks had stationed 148,000
men, in two separate armies, on the Asiatic shore of the Black Sea,
to coöperate with Schamyl, and to observe, at the same time, the
movements of the enemy. The Turks and the Russians had, consequently,
about an equal number of troops, both upon the Danube and in Asia.
The first cartridge burnt in anger, was at the affair of Issatcha,
scarcely more than a skirmish between a handful of Egyptians and
Russians, and leading to no important results. The Russian general
would fain have confined operations--for a time at least--to such
skirmishes, from his unwillingness to risk the prestige with which
the Russians had continued hitherto to surround their arms; but this
policy accorded not with the views of Omar Pacha, who was anxious to
elevate the _morale_ of his men, and to prove to them, by the most
conclusive of all arguments, their capability to contend with those
whom they had been led to regard with so much respect.
CHAPTER IX.
OMER PACHA.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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