Now it will be agreed that instead of defining belief and meaning in terms of the same thing and thus identifying them, we ought sharply to distinguish between them. To have the meaning of a thing is not at all the same as to believe in it. Thus one may have clearly in mind the meaning of centaurs or of fairies or of any of the characters of mythology without in the slightest degree believing in them. Defining these things in terms of sensible effects, we could say that we know their meaning in the sense that we understand which sensible effects would be involved if they did exist. But to have a belief about them would mean that we would _expect_ these sensible effects. In other words, a belief involves the possibility of fulfillment or frustration of expectation. To believe in anything is therefore a distinct step beyond understanding it. In inserting these theories of reality and of belief in this discussion of a method for clear apprehension, Peirce is passing beyond a doctrine of clearness and involving himself in a doctrine of truth. We have seen that he does not seem to be able to maintain the postulated reality underlying his description of the scientific method for attaining truth. And it now seems that he is in equal difficulty with belief. If _meaning_ is simply a sum of habits, belief is _not_ simply a sum of habits, for the two are not the same. And if, as we have said, the quality that distinguishes belief from meaning is the fact that it involves expectation, then we appear to be on the verge of a new theory of truth,--a theory saying that truth is simply the fulfillment of these expectations. Such, we may note, is the interpretation that Dewey puts upon the pragmatic method,--such is the theory of truth that he finds involved in it. The interpretations of pragmatism which came particularly to the notice of Peirce, however, were those made by James and Schiller, and against these, we may say here, he made vigorous protest. These he regarded as perversions of his doctrine. And he was so desirous of indicating that his own theory of clearness involved for himself no such developments as these, that, in order to make the distinctions clear, he renamed his own doctrine.