James first uses the term 'pragmatism', as Peirce had done, to refer to a method for attaining clearness. When, in 1898, he brought again before the public the original article by Peirce, he was simply expounding the Peircian doctrine without making any attempt to pass beyond it. But, as we have just seen, he later gave it a construction, an interpretation as a theory of truth, with which its originator could not agree. In this chapter we may, therefore, look first at his exposition of the doctrine of clearness, and after that, in order to understand James' development of the doctrine into a theory of truth, we may turn back for a moment to some of his previous publications on the question of truth. It will then be possible to trace chronologically his developing attitude toward the truth controversy. From this we may pass finally to an indication of some of the difficulties in which he becomes involved. The most important of these, it may be said again, is that he construes the test of truth of an idea to be, not merely that the idea leads to expected consequences, but that it leads to predominantly desirable consequences. The outcomes which stand as evidence for truth are then not merely outcomes bringing fulfilled expectations but outcomes bringing happiness. JAMES' EXPOSITION OF PEIRCE. James in expounding the doctrine of Peirce explains the pragmatic principle as a method of investigating philosophic controversies, reducing them to essentials (clear meanings), and selecting those worthy of discussion.[2] "Suppose", he says, "that there are two different philosophical definitions, or propositions, or maxims, or what not, which seem to contradict each other, and about which men dispute. If, by assuming the truth of the one, you can foresee no practical consequence to anybody, at any time or place, which is different from what you would foresee if you assumed the truth of the other, why then the difference between the two propositions is no real difference--it is only a specious and verbal difference, unworthy of future contention.... There can _be_ no difference which does not _make_ a difference--no difference in the abstract truth which does not express itself in a difference of concrete fact, and of conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed upon somebody, somehow, somewhere and somewhen.... The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it would make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the one which is true". (p.675). [2] "The Pragmatic Method", University of California Chronicle 1898. Reprinted in Journal of Philosophy, 1904, v. 1, p. 673. Page references are to the latter.