The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and DeweyGeyer, Denton Loring
Philosophy
The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey
Geyer, Denton Loring
Dewey, John, 1859-1952; James, William, 1842-1910; Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914; Pragmatism
The changing position of William James is then followed through
magazine articles and books appearing successively during a period of
about thirty years. One finds here a gradually but continually
widening divergence from the rationalistic theories, which culminates
finally in the much-quoted extreme statements of the book
'Pragmatism'. The few subsequently published references to truth seem
to consist largely of defenses or retractions of the tenets there set
forth. As has been so often said, William James was too sympathetic
toward the doctrines of other men to maintain a consistent doctrine of
his own. His best work, like that of the higher literary type to which
he approached, was to transcribe and interpret the feelings of other
men. His genius lay in the clearness with which he could translate
these ideas and the lucid fashion in which he could cut to the heart
of ambiguities in them. With the highest and most sincere admiration
for the spirit of James' labors in philosophy and psychology, the
writer is unable to find there permanent contributions to the solution
of the particular problem which we have before us here, the problem of
truth. In his splendid protest against all static theories, he seems
to have accepted pragmatism for what it was not rather than for what
it was. It was not a cut-and-dried system leaving no room for
individuality, and that this was one of his strongest reasons for
accepting it is shown by his asking again and again: "If this
(pragmatism) is not truth, what is?" He was attempting to find a
theory--almost any theory, one thinks sometimes--which would serve as
an alternative to the older doctrines so incompatible with his
temperament.
It is interesting to note that the frequent protests made by Peirce
against the turn given his ideas by his followers are always directed
against the work of James and Schiller, and never, so far as I have
been able to ascertain, against that of Dewey. It therefore seems
worth while to undertake a direct comparison between the views of
Peirce and Dewey. This comparison, then, occupies the latter part of
the thesis, with the result, it may be said at once, that Dewey's work
is found to be very closely related to the original formulation of
pragmatism as made by Peirce.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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