Something of the same idea is stated again four years later in an article which appeared in Mind[5] and which was republished the following year as a chapter of the Principles of Psychology.[6] One passage will show the general trend; "A conception to prevail, must _terminate_ in a world of orderly experience. A rare phenomenon, to displace frequent ones, must belong with others more frequent still. The history of science is strewn with wrecks and ruins of theory--essences and principles, fluids and forces--once fondly clung to, but found to hang together with no facts of sense. The exceptional phenomena solicit our belief in vain until such time as we chance to conceive of them as of kinds already admitted to exist. What science means by 'verification' is no more than this, that _no object of conception shall be believed which sooner or later has not some permanent object of sensation for its term_.... Sensible vividness or pungency is then the vital factor in reality when once the conflict between objects, and the connecting of them together in the mind, has begun." (Italics mine). [5] "The Psychology of Belief", Mind 1889, v. 14, p. 31. [6] Vol. II, chapter XXI. And in another connection he expresses the idea as follows: "Conceptual systems which neither began nor left off in sensations would be like bridges without piers. Systems about fact must plunge themselves into sensations as bridges plunge themselves into the rock. Sensations are the stable rock, the _terminus a quo_ and the _terminus ad quem_ of thought. To find such termini is our aim with all our theories---to conceive first when and where a certain sensation may be had and then to have it. Finding it stops discussion. Failure to find it kills the false conceit of knowledge. Only when you deduce a possible sensation for me from your theory, and give it to me when and where the theory requires, do I begin to be sure that your thought has anything to do with truth." (11:7). In 1902 James contributed to the "Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology" published by J. Mark Baldwin the following definition for Pragmatism. "The doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experience to be expected, if the conception be true; which consequences would be different if it were untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed. If a second conception should not appear to have either consequences, then it must really be only the first conception under a different name. In methodology it is certain that to trace and compare their respective consequences is an admirable way of establishing the different meanings of different conceptions".