Throughout the book, as I should like to point out, James is using 'pragmatism' in two senses, and 'truth' in two senses. The two meanings of pragmatism he recognizes himself, and points out clearly the difference between pragmatism as a method for attaining clearness in our ideas and pragmatism as a theory of the truth or falsity of those ideas. But the two meanings of 'truth' he does not distinguish. And it is here that he differs from Dewey, as we shall presently see. He differed from Peirce on the question of the meaning of pragmatism--as to whether it could be developed to include a doctrine of truth as well as of clearness. He differs from Dewey on the question of 'truth'--as to whether truth shall be used in both of the two specified senses or only in one of them. _The Ambiguity of 'Satisfaction'_--The double meaning of truth in James' writing at this date may be indicated in this way: While truth is to be defined in terms of satisfaction, what is satisfaction? Does it mean that I am to be satisfied _of_ a certain quality in the idea, or that I am to be satisfied _by_ it? In other words, is the criterion of truth the fact that the idea leads as it promised or is it the fact that its leading, whether just as it promised or not, is desirable? Which, in short, are we to take as truth,--fulfilled expectations or value of results? It is in failing to distinguish between these two that James involves himself, I believe, in most of his difficulties, and it is in the recognition and explicit indication of this difference that Dewey differentiates himself from James. We may pass on to cite specific instances in which James uses each of these criteria. We will find, of course, that there are passages which can be interpreted as meaning either value or fulfillment, but there are many in which the use of value as a criterion seems unmistakable. The following quotations may be instanced: "If theological views prove to have value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true, will depend entirely on their relation to the other truths that have also to be acknowledged". For example, in so far as the Absolute affords comfort, it is not sterile; "it has that amount of value; it performs a concrete function. I myself ought to call the Absolute true 'in so far forth', then; and I unhesitatingly now do so". (p.72). "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is to build out and determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths". (p. 299). "The true is the name for whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons". (p. 76).