Since a true idea is defined, then, as one which leads as it promised, it is obvious that truth will not be concerned in any way with incidental or accidental _values_ which might be led to by the idea. It has no relation to whether the goal is _worth while_ being led to or not. James speaks of truth as a leading that is worth while. For Dewey the goal may be valuable, useless, or even pernicious,--these are entirely irrelevant to truth, which is determined solely by the fact that the idea leads _as it promised_. The existence of this distinction was pointed out, after the appearance of James' "Pragmatism", by Dewey himself.[14] After a careful discussion of some other points of difference, he says of this matter of the place of the value of an idea in reference to its truth: "We have the theory that ideas as ideas are always working hypotheses concerning attaining particular empirical results, and are tentative programs (or sketches of method) for attaining them. If we stick consistently to this notion of ideas, only consequences which are actually produced by the working of the idea in cooperation with, or application to, prior realities are good consequences in the specific sense of good which is relevant to establishing the truth of an idea. This is, at times, unequivocally recognized by Mr. James.... But at other times any good that flows from acceptance of a belief is treated as if it were an evidence, _in so far_, of the truth of the idea. This holds particularly when theological notions are under consideration. Light would be thrown upon how Mr. James conceives this matter by statements from him on such points as these: If ideas terminate in good consequences, but yet the goodness of the consequence was no part of the intention of the idea, does the goodness have any verifying force? If the goodness of consequences arises from the context of the idea rather than from the idea itself, does it have any verifying force? If an idea leads to consequences which are good in the _one_ respect only of fulfilling the intent of the idea, (as when one drinks a liquid to test the idea that it is a poison), does the badness of the consequences in every other respect detract from the verifying force of these consequences? [14] "What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical?", Journal of Philosophy, etc., 1908, v. 5, p. 85. "Since Mr. James has referred to me as saying 'truth is what gives satisfaction' (p. 234), I may remark ... that I never identified _any_ satisfaction with the truth of an idea, save _that_ satisfaction which arises when the idea as working hypothesis or tentative method is applied to prior existences in such a way as to fulfil what it intends....