The Principles of Biology, Volume 1 (of 2)Spencer, Herbert
Science
The Principles of Biology, Volume 1 (of 2)
Spencer, Herbert
Biology
§ 101. While the classifications of botanists and zoologists have become
more and more natural in their arrangements, there has grown up a certain
artificiality in their abstract nomenclature. When aggregating the smallest
groups into larger groups and these into groups still larger, they have
adopted certain general terms expressive of the successively more
comprehensive divisions; and the habitual use of these terms, needful for
purposes of convenience, has led to the tacit assumption that they answer
to actualities in Nature. It has been taken for granted that species,
genera, orders, and classes, are assemblages of definite values--that every
genus is the equivalent of every other genus in respect of its degree of
distinctness; and that orders are separated by lines of demarcation which
are as broad in one place as another. Though this conviction is not a
formulated one, the disputes continually occurring among naturalists on the
questions, whether such and such organisms are specifically or generically
distinct, and whether this or that peculiarity is or is not of ordinal
importance, imply that the conviction is entertained even where not avowed.
Yet that differences of opinion like these arise and remain unsettled,
except when they end in the establishment of sub-species, sub-genera,
sub-orders, and sub-classes, sufficiently shows that the conviction is
ill-based. And this is equally shown by the impossibility of obtaining any
definition of the degree of difference which warrants each further
elevation in the hierarchy of classes.
It is, indeed, a wholly gratuitous assumption that organisms admit of being
placed in groups of equivalent values; and that these may be united into
larger groups which are also of equivalent values; and so on. There is no
_à priori_ reason for expecting this; and there is no _à posteriori_
evidence implying it, save that which begs the question--that which asserts
one distinction to be generic and another to be ordinal, because it is
assumed that such distinctions must be either generic or ordinal. The
endeavour to thrust plants and animals into these definite partitions is of
the same nature as the endeavour to thrust them into linear series. Not
that it does violence to the facts in anything like the same degree; but
still, it does violence to the facts. Doubtless the making of divisions and
sub-divisions, is extremely useful; or rather, it is necessary. Doubtless,
too, in reducing the facts to something like order they must be partially
distorted. So long as the distorted form is not mistaken for the actual
form, no harm results. But it is needful for us to remember that while our
successively subordinate groups have a certain general correspondence with
the realities, they tacitly ascribe to the realities a regularity which
does not exist.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account