The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)James, William
Philosophy
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
Let the line _a--b_ represent the threshold of consciousness: then
everything drawn below that line will symbolize a physical process,
everything above it will mean a fact of mind. Let the crosses stand
for the physical blows, the circles for the events in successively
higher orders of nerve-cells, and the horizontal marks for the facts of
feeling. Spencer's argument implies that each order of cells transmits
just as many impulses as it receives to the cells above it; so that if
the blows come at the rate of 20,000 in a second the cortical cells
discharge at the same rate, and one unit of feeling corresponds to each
one of the 20,000 discharges. Then, and only then, does 'integration'
occur, by the 20,000 units of feeling 'compounding with themselves'
into the 'continuous state of consciousness' represented by the short
line at the top of the figure.
Now such an interpretation as this flies in the face of physical
analogy, no less than of logical intelligibility. Consider physical
analogy first,
A pendulum may be deflected by a single blow, and swing back. Will
it swing back the more often the more we multiply the blows? No; for
if they rain upon the pendulum too fast, it will not swing at all
but remain deflected in a sensibly stationary state. In other words,
increasing the cause numerically need not equally increase numerically
the effect. Blow through a tube: you get a certain musical note; and
increasing the blowing increases for a certain time the loudness of
the note. Will this be true indefinitely? No; for when a certain force
is reached, the note, instead of growing louder, suddenly disappears
and is replaced by its higher octave. Turn on the gas slightly and
light it: you get a tiny flame. Turn on more gas, and the breadth
of the flame increases. Will this relation increase indefinitely?
No, again; for at a certain moment up shoots the flame into a ragged
streamer and begins to hiss. Send slowly through the nerve of a
frog's gastrocnemius muscle a succession of galvanic shocks: you get
a succession of twitches. Increasing the number of shocks does not
increase the twitching; on the contrary, it stops it, and we have
the muscle in the apparently stationary state of contraction called
tetanus. This last fact is the true analogue of what must happen
between the nerve-cell and the sensory fibre. It is certain that cells
are more inert than fibres, and that rapid vibrations in the latter can
only arouse relatively simple processes or states in the former. The
higher cells may have even a slower rate of explosion than the lower,
and so the twenty thousand supposed blows of the outer air may be
'integrated' in the cortex into a very small number of cell-discharges
in a second. This other diagram will serve to contrast this supposition
with Spencer's. In Fig. 26 all 'integration' occurs below the threshold
of consciousness. The frequency of cell-events becomes more and more
reduced as we approach the cells to which feeling is most directly
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