The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)James, William
Philosophy
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
"It is possible, then--may we not even say probable?--that something
of the same order as that which we call a nervous shock is the
ultimate unit of consciousness; and that all the unlikenesses
among our feelings result from unlike modes of integration of this
ultimate unit. I say of the same order, because there are discernible
differences among nervous shocks that are differently caused; and
the primitive nervous shock probably differs somewhat from each of
them. And I say of the same order, for the further reason that while
we may ascribe to them a general likeness in nature, we must suppose
a great unlikeness in degree. The nervous shocks recognized as such
are violent--must be violent before they can be perceived amid the
procession of multitudinous vivid feelings suddenly interrupted by
them. But the rapidly-recurring nervous shocks of which the different
forms of feeling consist, we must assume to be of comparatively
moderate, or even of very slight intensity. Were our various
sensations and emotions composed of rapidly-recurring shocks as strong
as those ordinarily called shocks, they would be unbearable; indeed
life would cease at once. We must think of them rather as successive
faint pulses of subjective change, each having the same quality as
the strong pulse of subjective change distinguished as a nervous
shock."[168]
INSUFFICIENCY OF THESE PROOFS.
[Illustration: FIG. 25.]
Convincing as this argument of Mr. Spencer's may appear on a first
reading, it is singular how weak it really is.[169] We do, it is true,
when we study the connection between a musical note and its outward
cause, find the note simple and continuous while the cause is multiple
and discrete. Somewhere, then, there _is_ a transformation, reduction,
or fusion. The question is, Where?--in the nerve-world or in the
mind-world? Really we have no experimental proof by which to decide;
and if decide we must, analogy and _a priori_ probability can alone
guide us. Mr. Spencer assumes that the fusion must come to pass in the
mental world, and that the physical processes get through air and ear,
auditory nerve and medulla, lower brain and hemispheres, without their
number being reduced. Figure 25 will make the point clear.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account