The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2) — John Shaqi
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)James, William
Philosophy
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
In all this we assume that the hemispheres do not _natively_ couple
any particular sense-impression with any special motor discharge. They
only register, and preserve traces of, such couplings as are already
organized in the reflex centres below. But this brings it inevitably
about that, when a chain of experiences has been already registered and
the first link is impressed once again from without, the last link will
often be awakened in _idea_ long before it can exist in _fact_. And
if this last link were previously coupled with a motion, that motion
may now come from the mere ideal suggestion without waiting for the
actual impression to arise. Thus an animal with hemispheres acts in
_anticipation_ of future things; or, to use our previous formula, he
acts from considerations of distant good and ill. If we give the name
of _partners_ to the original couplings of impressions with motions
in a reflex way, then we may say that the function of the hemispheres
is simply to bring about _exchanges among the partners_. Movement
_m^n_, which natively is sensation _s^n_'s partner, becomes through
the hemispheres the partner of sensation _s^1, s^2_, or _s^3_. It is
like the great commutating switch-board at a central telephone station.
No new elementary process is involved; no impression nor any motion
peculiar to the hemispheres; but any number of combinations impossible
to the lower machinery taken alone, and an endless consequent increase
in the possibilities of behavior on the creature's part.
All this, as a mere scheme,[7] is so clear and so concordant with the
general look of the facts as almost to impose itself on our belief;
but it is anything but clear in detail. The brain-physiology of late
years has with great effort sought to work out the paths by which
these couplings of sensations with movements take place, both in the
hemispheres and in the centres below.
So we must next test our scheme by the facts discovered m this
direction. We shall conclude, I think, after taking them all into
account, that the scheme probably makes the lower centres too
machine-like and the hemispheres not quite machine-like enough, and
must consequently be softened down a little. So much I may say in
advance. Meanwhile, before plunging into the details which await us, it
will somewhat clear our ideas if we contrast the modern way of looking
at the matter with the _phrenological_ conception which but lately
preceded it.
THE PHRENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION.
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