The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)James, William
Philosophy
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
[96] Naturally, as Schiff long ago pointed out (Lehrb. d. Muskel-u.
Nervenphysiologie, 1859, p. 213 ff.), the 'Rückenmarksseele,' if it
now exist, can have no higher sense-consciousness, for its incoming
currents are solely from the skin. But it may, in its dim way, both
feel, prefer, and desire. See, for the view favorable to the text:
G. H. Lewes, The Physiology of Common Life (1860), chap. ix. Goltz
(Nervencentren des Frosches 1869, pp. 102-130) thinks that the frog's
cord has no adaptative power. This may be the case in such experiments
as his, because the beheaded frog's short span of life does not give
it time to learn the new tricks asked for. But Rosenthal (Biologisches
Centralblatt, vol. iv, p. 247) and Mendelssohn (Berlin Akad.
Sitzungsberichte, 1885, p. 107) in their investigations on the simple
reflexes of the frog's cord, show that there is some adaptation to new
conditions, inasmuch as when usual paths of conduction are interrupted
by a cut, new paths are taken. According to Rosenthal, these grow more
pervious (i.e. require a smaller stimulus) in proportion as they are
more often traversed.
[97] Whether this evolution takes place through the inheritance of
habits acquired, or through the preservation of lucky variations, is an
alternative which we need not discuss here. We shall consider it in the
last chapter in the book. For our present purpose the _modus operandi_
of the evolution makes no difference, provided it be admitted to occur.
[98] See Schrader's Observations, _loc. cit._
CHAPTER III.
ON SOME GENERAL CONDITIONS OF BRAIN-ACTIVITY.
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