And yet the moment we reflect on this answer an insuperable logical difficulty seems to present itself. No single _quale_ of sensation can, by itself, amount to a consciousness of _position_. Suppose no feeling but that of a single point ever to be awakened. Could that possibly be the feeling of any special _whereness_ or _thereness_? Certainly not. _Only when a second point is felt to arise can the first one acquire a determination of up, down, right or left, and these determinations are all relative to that second point._ Each point, so far as it is _placed, is_ then only by virtue of what it _is not,_ namely, by virtue of another point. This is as much as to say that position has nothing _intrinsic_ about it; and that, although a feeling of absolute bigness may, _a feeling of place cannot, possibly form an immanent element in any single isolated sensation._ The very writer we have quoted has given heed to this objection, for he continues (p. 335) by saying that the sensations thus originally localized "are only so _in themselves_, but not in the representation of consciousness, which is not yet present.... They are, in the first instance, devoid of all mutual relations with each other." But such a localization of the sensation 'in itself' would seem to mean nothing more than the susceptibility or _potentiality_ of being distinctly localized when the time came and other conditions became fulfilled. Can we now discover anything about such susceptibility in itself before it has borne its ulterior fruits in the developed consciousness? _'Local Signs.'_ To begin with, every sensation of the skin and every visceral sensation seems to derive from its topographic seat a peculiar shade of feeling, which it would not have in another place. And this feeling _per se_ seems quite another thing from the perception of the place. Says Wundt[160]: