The Principles of Psychology, Volume 2 (of 2)James, William
Science
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 2 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
Nature, as Reid says, is frugal in her operations, and will not be at
the expense of a particular instinct to give us that knowledge which
experience and habit will soon produce. Reproduced sights and contacts
tied together with the present sensation in the unity of a _thing_ with
a name, these are the complex objective stuff out of which my actually
perceived table is made. Infants must go through a long education of
the eye and ear before they can perceive the realities which adults
perceive. _Every perception is an acquired perception._[86]
_Perception may then be defined_, in Mr. Sully's words, as that process
by which the mind
"supplements a sense-impression by an accompaniment or escort of
revived sensations, the whole aggregate of actual and revived
sensations being solidified or 'integrated' into the form of a
percept, that is, an apparently immediate apprehension or cognition of
an object now present in a particular locality or region of space."[87]
Every reader's mind will supply abundant examples of the process here
described; and to write them down would be therefore both unnecessary
and tedious. In the chapter on Space we have already discussed some of
the more interesting ones; for in our perceptions of shape and position
it is really difficult to decide how much of our sense of the object is
due to reproductions of past experience, and how much to the immediate
sensations of the eye. I shall accordingly confine myself in the rest
of this chapter to certain additional generalities connected with the
perceptive process.
* * * * *
The first point is relative to that 'solidification' or 'integration,'
whereof Mr. Sully speaks, of the present with the absent and merely
represented sensations. Cerebrally taken, these words mean no more
than this, that the process aroused in the sense-organ has shot into
various paths which habit has already organized in the hemispheres,
and that instead of our having the sort of consciousness which would
be correlated with the simple sensorial process, we have that which is
correlated with this more complex process. This, as it turns out, is
the consciousness of that more complex 'object,' the whole 'thing,'
instead of being the consciousness of that more simple object, the few
qualities or attributes which actually impress our peripheral nerves.
This consciousness must have the unity which every 'section' of our
stream of thought retains so long as its objective content does not
sensibly change. More than this we cannot say; we certainly ought not
to say what usually is said by psychologists, and treat the perception
as a sum of distinct psychic entities, the present sensation namely,
_plus_ a lot of images from the past, all 'integrated' together in a
way impossible to describe. The perception is one state of mind or
nothing--as I have already so often said.
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