You will soon enough see what the soul apparatus is. It is irrelevant to ask of what material it is made, as this question has no psychological interest. As far as psychology is concerned, the question of material is just as unimportant as the question would be in the realm of optic, of whether a telescope is made of metal or cardboard. The question of matter does not enter here at all, but there is great importance attached to the aspect of space. This obscure soul apparatus, which serves as the agent for all processes of our soul, is conceived by us as an instrument consisting of several parts. Each of these parts we shall call a stage. There is an individual function attached to each of these stages, and all of them are correlated to each other in reference to space. Aspects of space like “near” and “far,” and “above” and “below,” for the time being, only serve to illustrate the regular sequence of the functions allotted to the different stages of the soul apparatus.—Do you still follow me? “Hardly! However, I hope I will understand you eventually. At any rate, your explanation appeals to me as a somewhat peculiar description of the anatomy of the soul, which, according to biologists, is nonexistent.” I will grant that what you call my “somewhat peculiar description of the anatomy of the soul,” is merely a parallel drawn upon for the purpose of elucidation, as is so often done in sciences. In the early stages of a new science such parallels have always been quite primitive,—open to revision, as it were. I consider it superfluous to strengthen my argument by referring to the frequently applied “if,” as is quite popular in such cases. The actual value of such “if” argumentations—“fiction” the philosopher Vaihinger would call it—greatly depends on how advantageously this argumentation may be applied to the case in question. However, for argument’s sake, let us accept the popular conception and assume that within us there is a psychical organization, recording sensations and perceptions of physical wants on one hand, and releasing motoric actions on the other. This medium for establishing this definite coöperation we call the “I.” Of course, this is nothing new. Each one of us takes this for granted, if he is not a philosopher, and some despite being philosophers. However, our description of the psychical apparatus is not by far complete. Aside from the “I,” we perceive another region of the soul, much more extensive, much more impressive, and much more obscure than the “I,” which we designate the “It.” It is the relation between the “I” and the “It” upon which we shall dwell first.