───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1912–1913 1 4·156 1 3·970 1913 15 0 0 15 0 0 24 0 3 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1913–1914 1 4·156 1 3·937 1914 15 14 0 15 2 0 26 10 0 23 15 6 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1914–1915 1 4·094 1 3·937 1915 15 13 6 15 5 0 25 14 0 24 8 0 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Taking a general survey of the stability of the rupee with regard to its value in terms of gold, it will be noticed that from the date of the Mint closure up to 1898 the rupee was far below par. The depreciation of the rupee, measured in terms of exchange or price of gold or sovereign, ranged somewhere between 25 to 30 per cent. So great was the depreciation that it redoubled the difficulties confronting the Government when the rupee was not fixed to gold. The financing the Home Treasury by the usual means of selling Council Bills became well-nigh impossible.³⁰⁶ The [pg 189] Secretary of State found himself in an embarrassing position. Offering to sell below par involved the obloquy of having led the way to the defeat of the policy of stabilizing exchange. Refusing to sell at market rates involved the danger of a dry Treasury. The Government of India suggested that the Secretary should lay down a minimum rate for or a maximum amount of the bills that he put upon the market. The Secretary of State agreed to neither, but consented to reduce his drawings so as not to unduly depress the exchange rate. The drawings of the Secretary of State during the first fiscal year since the Mint closure have been the smallest on record:— ³⁰⁶ _See_ Commons Paper 7 of 1894, East India (Currency and Sale of Bills). _TABLE XXIX_ _Council Drawings_