embodying the Huskisson plan in part in the Bank Charter Act of 1844, permitting the issue of notes against silver to the extent of one-fourth of the total issues.⁵⁶ Indeed, so great was the universal faith in the stability of silver that Holland changed in 1847 from what was practically a gold monometallism⁵⁷ to silver monometallism because her statesmen believed that “it had proved disastrous to the commercial and industrial interests of Holland to have a monetary system identical with that of England, whose financial revulsions, after its adoption [pg 28] of the gold standard, had been more frequent and more severe than in any other country, and whose injurious effects were felt in Holland scarcely less than in England. They maintained that the adoption of the silver standard would prevent England from disturbing the internal trade of Holland by draining off its money during such revulsions and would secure immunity from evils which did not originate in and for which Holland was not responsible.”⁵⁸ But stability was not the ground on which either the Court or Lord Liverpool made their choice of a standard metal to rest. If that had been the case, both probably would have selected silver. As it was, the difference in the choice of the two parties was only superficial. Indeed, the Court differed from Lord Liverpool, not because of any ulterior motives, but because they were both agreed on a fundamental proposition that not stability but popular preference should be the deciding factor in the choice of a standard metal. Their differences proceeded logically from the agreement. For on analysing the composition of the currency it was found that in England it was largely composed of gold and in India it was largely composed of silver. Granting their common premise, it is easy to account why gold was selected for England by Lord Liverpool and silver for India by the Court. Whether the actual composition of the currency is an evidence of popular preference cannot, of course, be so dogmatically asserted as was done by the Court and Lord Liverpool. So far as England is concerned, the interpretation of Lord Liverpool has been questioned by the great economist David Ricardo. In his _High Price of Bullion_, Ricardo wrote:— ⁵⁰ The author of _A Treatise on the Coinage of the Realm_ was anticipated by Sir John Shore, the Governor of Bengal, in his Minute, op. cit., par. 55. ⁵¹ Cf. H. M. Dunning, _Indian Currency_, 1898, _passim_; also S. V. Doraiswami, op. cit., _passim_. ⁵² Cf. Dana Norton, _The Silver Pound_, 1887, p. 161. ⁵³ Cf. the evidence of A. Baring (afterwards Lord Ashuburton) before the Committee for Coin (1828), H. of C. Return 31 of 1830. ⁵⁴ See his Memorandum to the Cabinet printed by Gibbs, _A Colloquy on Currency_ (1894), Appendix, p. xlvii. ⁵⁵ For which, see Andréadès, _History of the Bank of England_, Supplement I.