in moving--happened before it was caused. Now it is impossible for us
to believe either of the only two alternatives--either that we do not
really move but only {36} appear to do so, or that the displacement our
movement causes really precedes the movement. When we meet with a
direct self-contradiction in our thoughts about anything, we can only
suppose that that about which we are thinking is in its nature
nonsensical, or else that our ideas about it are wrong.
It may perhaps be thought that the whole difficulty arises simply
because what we are trying to think consistently about is a reality
that is external to us. Space and time, movement, cause and effect are
ideas that apply to a world outside and independent of the mind that
tries to think it. May not this be the reason of our failure and the
whole explanation of the seeming contradiction? If we turn our
thoughts inward upon our own being and think of the self, the I, the
real subject of experience, then surely where thought is at home and
its object is mental not physical, we shall know reality. It is not
so. The same self-contradiction characterises our ideas when we try to
present the real object of inner perception as when we try to present
the real object of external perception. Not, of course, that it is
possible to doubt the reality of our own existence, but that we fail
altogether to express the meaning of the self we so surely know to
exist in any idea which does not fall into self-contradiction. As in
the case of the thing and its qualities, we think that there is
something distinct from the qualities in which they inhere and yet find
ourselves unable to present to the mind any consistent idea of such
thing, so we think that there must be some substance or basis of
personal identity, some real self which _has_ the successive changing
conscious states, which has the character which distinguishes our
actions as personal but which nevertheless _is_ not itself these
things. The self-contradiction {37} in the idea of self, or I, or
subject, is that it both cannot change and is always changing. As
unchanging, we distinguish it from our body, which is an external
object among other objects and is different from other objects only in
the more direct and intimate relation in which it stands to us. The
body is always changing; never for two successive moments is it exactly
the same combination of chemical elements. We distinguish also ourself
from that consciousness which is memory, the awareness of past
experience, from present feelings, desires, thoughts, and
strivings--these, we say, belong to the self but are not it. The self
must have qualities and dwell in the body, guiding, directing, and
controlling it, yet this self we never perceive, nor can we conceive
it, for our idea of it is of a reality that changes and is yet
unchangeable.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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