Judge Waite, after the author of “The Supernatural” (p. 337), says, to refer to the more distant antecedent is contrary to the rule. The rule is of but slight importance as compared to the whole scope. And to apply the rule here, Peter would be the one who changed the names of the sons of Zebedee; for Peter, and not Christ, would be the last antecedent. [15] As quoted by Dr. Ezra Abbot, pp. 98, 99; see, also, _Inter-Ocean_ of February 12, 1881. [16] Abbot, etc., p. 103, 104; _Inter-Ocean_ of February 12. [17] Bampton Lectures for 1877, pp. 279, 281. CHAPTER VIII. PRESUMPTION OF PERMANENCY. In general, says Mr. Phillips,[1] there is a presumption in favor of the continuance of what is once proved to have existed. It is a familiar principle of law, says Chief Justice Parker, that a state of things once shown to exist is presumed to continue until something is shown to rebut the presumption. And this position, says Professor Greenleaf, is founded “on the experienced _continuance_ or permanency of longer or shorter duration in human affairs. When, therefore, the existence of a person, a personal relation, or a state of things, is once established by proof, the law presumes that the person, relation, or state of things continues to exist as before, until the contrary is shown, or until a different presumption is raised from the nature of the subject in question.” With other examples of the application of this presumption, he mentions opinions and religious convictions: “The _opinions_ also of individuals, once entertained and expressed, and the _state_ of _mind_, once proved to exist, are presumed to remain unchanged until the contrary appears. Thus, all the members of a Christian community, being presumed to entertain the common faith, no man is supposed to disbelieve the existence and moral government of God, until it is shown from his own declarations.” This presumption being founded in reason and experience, is of universal application. It is not conclusive, but stands “until something is shown to rebut it.” It is the basis of Hume’s argument against miracles, but which he misapplies, making it conclusive instead of presumptive evidence. As a presumption, it is strictly applicable to the question in hand, and will be found to have great force. For, from this natural and reasonable presumption, it should be taken, unless the contrary is proved, that the accepted “Memoirs” of Justin’s time _remained_ in the churches. Hence if we can ascertain with entire certainty _what_ “Memoirs” were accepted in the churches in the year 180, and no evidence of displacement and substitution appears, we shall have _most satisfactory evidence_ what “Memoirs” were the ones intended by him in his Apology. [1] Phillips on Evidence, 4th Am. Ed., 640: 17 N. H. Rep., 409: 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, §§ 41, 42. CHAPTER IX. THE MEMOIRS OF THE YEAR ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY.