“Not in the shape I have just referred to,” he replied; “but, according to the same author, it would be a venial sin ‘were a person to gorge himself, unnecessarily, with eating and drinking, to such a degree as to produce vomiting.’[195] So much for that point. I would now say a little about the facilities we have invented for avoiding sin in worldly conversations and intrigues. One of the most embarrassing of these cases is how to avoid telling lies, particularly when one is anxious to induce a belief in what is false. In such cases, our doctrine of equivocations has been found of admirable service, according to which, as Sanchez has it, ‘it is permitted to use ambiguous terms, leading people to understand them in another sense from that in which we understand them ourselves.’”[196] “I know that already, father,” said I. “We have published it so often,” continued he, “that at length, it seems, everybody knows of it. But do you know what is to be done when no equivocal words can be got?” “No, father.” “I thought as much,” said the Jesuit; “this is something new, sir: I mean the doctrine of mental reservations. ‘A man may swear,’ as Sanchez says in the same place, ‘that he never did such a thing (though he actually did it), meaning within himself that he did not do so on a certain day, or before he was born, or understanding any other such circumstance, while the words which he employs have no such sense as would discover his meaning. And this is very convenient in many cases, and quite innocent, when necessary or conducive to one’s health, honor, or advantage.’” “Indeed, father! is that not a lie, and perjury to boot?” “No,” said the father; “Sanchez and Filiutius prove that it is not; for, says the latter, ‘it is the intention that determines the quality of the action.’[197] And he suggests a still surer method for avoiding falsehood, which is this: After saying aloud, _I swear that I have not done that_, to add, in a low voice, _to-day_; or after saying aloud, _I swear_, to interpose in a whisper, _that I say_, and then continue aloud, _that I have done that_. This, you perceive, is telling the truth.”[198] “I grant it,” said I; “it might possibly, however, be found to be telling the truth in a low key, and falsehood in a loud one; besides, I should be afraid that many people might not have sufficient presence of mind to avail themselves of these methods.” “Our doctors,” replied the Jesuit, “have taught, in the same passage, for the benefit of such as might not be expert in the use of these reservations, that no more is required of them, to avoid lying, than simply to say that _they have not done_ what they have done, provided ‘they have, in general, the intention of giving to their language the sense which an _able man_ would give to it.’ Be candid, now, and confess if you have not often felt yourself embarrassed, in consequence of not knowing this?” “Sometimes,” said I.