“That is a delicate point,” he replied. “We require to make use here of Father Bauny’s distinction, which he lays down in his Summary of Sins: ‘Envy of the spiritual good of our neighbor is mortal, but envy of his temporal good is only venial.’” “And why so, father?” “You shall hear,” said he. “‘For the good that consists in temporal things is so slender, and so insignificant in relation to heaven, that it is of no consideration in the eyes of God and his saints.’” “But, father, if temporal good is so _slender_, and of so little consideration, how do you come to permit men’s lives to be taken away in order to preserve it?”[193] “You mistake the matter entirely,” returned the monk; “you were told that temporal good was of no consideration in the eyes of God, but not in the eyes of men.” “That idea never occurred to me,” I replied; “and now, it is to be hoped that, in virtue of these same distinctions, the world will get rid of mortal sins altogether.” “Do not flatter yourself with that,” said the father; “there are still such things as mortal sins—there is sloth, for example.” “Nay, then, father dear!” I exclaimed, “after that, farewell to all ‘the joys of life!’” “Stay,” said the monk, “when you have heard Escobar’s definition of that vice, you will perhaps change your tone: ‘Sloth,’ he observes, ‘lies in grieving that spiritual things are spiritual, as if one should lament that the sacraments are the sources of grace; which would be a mortal sin.’” “O my dear sir!” cried I, “I don’t think that anybody ever took it into his head to be slothful in that way.” “And accordingly,” he replied, “Escobar afterwards remarks: ‘I must confess that it is very rarely that a person falls into the sin of sloth.’ You see now how important it is to _define_ things properly?” “Yes, father, and this brings to my mind your other definitions about assassinations, ambuscades, and superfluities. But why have you not extended your method to all cases, and given definitions of all vices in your way; so that people may no longer sin in gratifying themselves?” “It is not always essential,” he replied, “to accomplish that purpose by changing the definitions of things. I may illustrate this by referring to the subject of good cheer, which is accounted one of the greatest pleasures of life, and which Escobar thus sanctions in his ‘Practice according to our Society:’ ‘Is it allowable for a person to eat and drink to repletion, unnecessarily, and solely for pleasure? Certainly he may, according to Sanchez, provided he does not thereby injure his health; because the natural appetite may be permitted to enjoy its proper functions.’”[194] “Well, father, that is certainly the most complete passage, and the most finished maxim in the whole of your moral system! What comfortable inferences may be drawn from it! Why, and is gluttony, then, not even a venial sin?”