“You must conclude then, father, that neither sinners nor yet saints have always that knowledge, or those desires and inspirations every time they offend; that is, to use your own terms, they have not always actual grace. Say no longer, with your modern authors, that it is impossible for those to sin who do not know righteousness; but rather join with St. Augustine and the ancient fathers in saying that it is impossible _not_ to sin, when we do not know righteousness: _Necesse est ut peccet, a quo ignoratur justitia_.” The good father, though thus driven from both of his positions, did not lose courage, but after ruminating a little, “Ha!” he exclaimed, “I shall settle you immediately.” And again taking up Father Bauny, he pointed to the same place he had before quoted, exclaiming: “Look now—see the ground on which he establishes his opinion! I was sure he would not be deficient in good proofs. Read what he quotes from Aristotle, and you will see that after so express an authority, you must either burn the books of this prince of philosophers or adopt our opinion. Hear, then, the principles which support Father Bauny: Aristotle states first, ‘_that an action cannot be imputed as blameworthy, if it be involuntary_.’” “I grant that,” said my friend. “This is the first time you have agreed together,” said I. “Take my advice, father, and proceed no further.” “That would be doing nothing,” he replied; “we must know what are the conditions necessary to constitute an action voluntary.” “I am much afraid,” returned I, “that you will get at loggerheads on that point.” “No fear of that,” said he; “this is sure ground—Aristotle is on my side. Hear, now, what Father Bauny says: ‘In order that an action be voluntary, it must proceed from a man who perceives, knows, and comprehends what is good and what is evil in it. _Voluntarium est_—that is a voluntary action, as we commonly say with the philosopher’ (that is Aristotle, you know, said the monk, squeezing my hand;) ‘_quod fit a principio cognoscente singula in quibus est actio_—which is done by a person knowing the particulars of the action; so that when the will is led inconsiderately, and without mature reflection, to embrace or reject, to do or omit to do anything, before the understanding has been able to see whether it would be right or wrong, such an action is neither good nor evil; because previous to this mental inquisition, view, and reflection on the good or bad qualities of the matter in question, the act by which it is done is not voluntary.’ Are you satisfied now?” said the father.