she recalled it in words, not as a feeling." In conclusion, I will quote from Fouillée, in connection with physical pain, an interesting observation made on himself:— “If I want to recall any given attack of toothache, I must form a mental image of the teeth where the pain was localised, and then of the word _pain_ which serves as a sign; but how am I to form an image of the pain _in itself_? Some philosophers declare the thing impossible, and allege that we only reproduce perceptions, intellectual states, and words. This is, in fact, what usually happens; but one can also, in my opinion, reproduce in the consciousness (though incompletely) the _painful_ element of toothache. To this end we must employ an indirect method. This procedure consists in directly calling up the images and motor reactions which accompany or follow toothache. I make the experiment, localising my thoughts in one of the molars on the right side; then I wait. The first thing to revive is a vague and general state, common to all painful sensations. Then this reaction grows more precise, as I concentrate my attention more and more on the tooth. At last I feel a greater afflux of blood into the gum, and even throbbings. Then I represent to myself a certain movement passing from one point of the tooth or gum to another; this is the passage of the pain. Thus I also revive the motor reaction caused by the pain, the convulsion of the jaw, etc. Finally, by thinking fixedly of all these circumstances, I end by feeling in a more or less dull way the rudiments of shooting pains. In an experiment just made, I have brought on real toothache in a molar, which, however, is subject to it.... The experiment leaves behind it a general irritability of the teeth, and an inclination to pass the tongue over the gums.”[102] ----- Footnote 102: Fouillée, _op. cit._, vol. i. pp. 200, 201. ----- Except for a few exceedingly clear observations, which I shall give later on, I have only vague replies regarding the revivability of sorrow, or moral pain, after the elimination of the conditions in which it had its origin. One person represents to himself “a general inertia and a febrile condition.” Another, who, during his time of military service, underwent periods of depression and _ennui_, “a year later, when the recollection comes back to him, sees everything of a grey hue.” We shall see presently that in some individuals the revival of moral pain is as acute as the initial state.