The executive department was in advance of the legislative, for James Monroe was President and John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State—two men who were at the front in the breadth of their political ideas, as shown by the Monroe doctrine, originated by Adams, endorsed and declared by Monroe. In the clause that refused to European powers the right longer to colonize on American territory, it was the Oregon country that was thus protected against the aggressions of Russia at the same time that a hint was given to England. No executive had been more courageous in asserting the intention of the United States to maintain her larger interests, and none had been more disposed to follow with national protection, so far as conformed with treaty relation, her citizens who were leading in the westward expansion of the country. Under such conditions what might the champions of an aggressive campaign expect to accomplish? Minds were filled with many questions. What was it right to do, and what was expedient; could a military post be established in the country as the President and Secretary wanted; could lands be granted to settlers as prospective emigrants wanted; could settlements be made and a civil government established as Floyd and Benton wanted? If it was right to do these things, was it expedient to do them, with the possibility of jeopardizing other interests less remote; was the nation ready to commit itself to an expansion of territory which might bring about many changes, and perhaps many dangers? It was the work of these men, by patient, persistent and continued effort to arouse a sentiment favorable to American interests, to gather and disseminate such information as would help to make a public opinion, and to keep the subject before congress and the people all the time. Confident themselves in the value of the country to the United States, and of the right of title to the country, they were anxious for a movement looking toward permanent occupation.