As might be expected in those days, every question must be tested by its effect upon the Union. The desire to perpetuate the Union, so dearly purchased, has laid at the foundation of many a policy. For its sake many things, desirable in themselves, have been given up or long delayed. That the national government could operate over a territory so vast, and regions so remote, with barriers separating them geographically from other sections, was questionable in the day before railroads and telegraphs. Yet, with a confidence inspired by their belief in the right of their position and in the final adjustment of national affairs to this action, the advocates of the measure argued that it would rather strengthen than weaken the Union: “The danger of separation would be less in a confederacy of twenty or thirty states with diverse interests than in one of smaller number,” because the multiplication of interests would neutralize divisions which grow strong where the number is small. Lastly, it was held that there was no need for present action, that no request had been made by the business public; it was a question to be settled not by the present generation, but by the one to follow, and that no harm, either to the American title or interests, could result. In the senate the discussion was briefer, but covered essentially the same ground. Benton took the leading part in favor of the bill, but received help from one of the senators from Virginia. The opposition cast much ridicule upon the idea of a senator going to and from Washington in less than a year, either by land or by water, around Cape Horn. It is not possible in the compass of this paper to give a full account of this interesting debate, but only so much as will characterize the first movement toward governmental control by the United States. As we retrace the discussions, in the light of subsequent events, we cannot refrain from admiration of those who optimistically trusted that the measure, if right in itself, need cause no fear of danger in the future.