27. Qu. Whether it be not ridiculous to suppose a legislature should be afraid to trust itself? 28. Qu. But, whether a private interest be not generally supported and pursued with more zeal than a public? 29. Qu. Whether the maxim, 'What is everybody's business is nobody's,' prevails in any country under the sun more than in Ireland? 30. Qu. Whether, nevertheless, the community of danger, which lulls private men asleep, ought not to awaken the public? 31. Qu. Whether there be not less security where there are more temptations and fewer checks? 32. Qu. If a man is to risk his fortune, whether it be more prudent to risk it on the credit of private men, or in that of the great assembly of the nation? 33. Qu. Where is it most reasonable to expect wise and punctual dealing, whether in a secret impenetrable recess, where credit depends on secrecy, or in a public management regulated and inspected by Parliament? 34. Qu. Whether a supine security be not catching, and whether numbers running the same risk, as they lessen the caution, may not increase the danger? 35. Qu. What real objection lies against a national bank erected by the legislature, and in the management of public deputies, appointed and inspected by the legislature? 36. Qu. What have we to fear from such a bank, which may not be as well feared without it? 37. Qu. How, why, by what means, or for what end, should it become an instrument of oppression? 38. Qu. Whether we can possibly be on a more precarious foot than we are already? Whether it be not in the power of any particular person at once to disappear and convey himself into foreign parts? or whether there can be any security in an estate of land when the demands upon it are unknown? 39. Qu. Whether the establishing of a national bank, if we suppose a concurrence of the government, be not very practicable? 40. Qu. But, whether though a scheme be never so evidently practicable and useful to the pubic, yet, if conceived to interfere with a private interest, it be not forthwith in danger of appearing doubtful, difficult, and impracticable? 41. Qu. Whether the legislative body hath not already sufficient power to hurt, if they may be supposed capable of it, and whether a bank would give them any new power? 42. Qu. What should tempt the pubic to defraud itself? 43. Qu. Whether, if the legislature destroyed the public, it would not be felo de se; and whether it be reasonable to suppose it bent on its own destruction? 44. Qu. Whether the objection to a pubic national bank, from want of secrecy, be not in truth an argument for it? 45. Qu. Whether the secrecy of private banks be not the very thing that renders them so hazardous? and whether, without that, there could have been of late so many sufferers? 46. Qu. Whether when all objections are answered it be still incumbent to answer surmises? 47. Qu. Whether it were just to insinuate that gentlemen would be against any proposal they could not turn into a job?