It is doubtful whether there is at present any interest in the commercial world which has a greater tendency to monopoly and combination than the railroad interest. There are in the United States some 40,000 railroad stations. Not more than 4,000 of these are junctions of two or more roads. At 90 per cent. of these stations shippers are therefore confined to one line of railroad, and are, in absence of State regulation, compelled to pay for transportation whatever price the companies may be disposed to charge, subject only to such restrictions as the proximity of competing points may impose. If competition obtained at all points where two or more roads meet, many railroad companies could not afford to charge excessive rates at non-competitive points along their lines of road, for such a policy would slowly but surely drive a large volume of their legitimate business to rival roads, to whose interest it would be to encourage by every means in their power such diversion of traffic. Railroads early recognized this fact and took steps to enable each line to control its local business. The first combinations among railroad companies to control prices at competitive points were rather crude; in fact, much cruder than the first Granger legislation. They were simple agreements among the various roads touching a common point to maintain certain fixed rates. But while each road was anxious to have the rates agreed upon maintained by all of its rivals, it cared but little about maintaining its own good faith, and it improved every opportunity to get business at reduced rates so long as it could reasonably hope to escape detection. As soon as any of the competing roads, through the falling-off of its business, became convinced that it was the victim of overreaching rivals, it retaliated by offering still lower rates to close-tongued shippers. This tricky rivalry would be continued until the animosity engendered by it would lead to an open rupture, and what railroad men are pleased to term a rate war would follow. As the schedule rates had before been unreasonably high, so they became now unreasonably low. Hostilities would be continued until all belligerents became exhausted and manifested a disposition to negotiate a treaty of peace. The former high rates would then be restored; the compact was carried out for a short time, to be again violated and finally annulled. These rate agreements were in vogue in New England before the War of the Rebellion and gradually found their way to the Middle States and the West. Wherever they were tried they were violated, until even among the most unsophisticated of freight agents a rate agreement was looked upon as a farce.